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This paper advances a new framework for analysing agrarian change in rural China and 
elsewhere in developing Asia, which centres on translocal family reproduction. The 
framework highlights the crucial connections between rural families’ translocal strategies for 
meeting reproductive, especially care needs, their changing aspirations for reproduction, and 
other aspects of agrarian change, including de-peasantization, de-agrarianization and social 
differentiation. In developing this framework, the paper refers to a village case study in 
central China, and draws on a critique of the ‘livelihoods perspective’ on agrarian change, 
and approaches focusing on ‘global householding,’ and the cultural reproduction of class and 
gender. 
 





In the early 1980s, most Chinese villagers belonged to a ‘peasant’ class, characterized by 
limited market participation and reliance on small landholdings and unwaged family farming 
labour for subsistence and reproduction (Sargeson 2016, 385). Since then, however, the rural 
population has experienced tremendous agrarian change, including partial de-agrarianization 
and proletarianization; increased class differentiation and a near-disappearance of the peasant 
class; and shifts in intra-family gender and intergenerational relationships, divisions of labour 
and inequalities. This paper advances a new framework for analysing this agrarian change, 
which centres on social reproduction, specifically, translocal family reproduction. 
As elsewhere in developing Asia, much of the agrarian change that has occurred in 
contemporary China has resulted from a rural response to the challenges and opportunities of 
capitalism that entails splitting the family, with some members migrating out in search of 
waged employment, while others continue to farm and care for dependants.1 According to 
official statistics, the total rural population numbered 619 million in 2014 (NBS 2015a, 16). 
Of these, 44 percent (274 million) were ‘rural migrant labourers’ (nongmingong), defined as 
those engaged in local non-agricultural employment or in employment outside their 
registered home township for at least six months in the year. About 65 percent of rural 
migrant labourers were male, and 79 percent were aged 21-50 years. One hundred and sixty 
eight million rural migrant labourers (61 percent of the total) worked outside their home 
township, including 79 million who moved to another province. However, most of those 
1 In China today, agrarian change is being driven primarily by either rural outmigration or dispossession 
resulting from the expropriation of land (or both at once). This paper draws on a case study from central China, 
where rates of rural outmigration are particularly high, and in most villages, outmigration is the key driver of 
agrarian change. For a study of agrarian change driven by the expropriation of land, which is more common in 
peri-urban areas and the highly urbanized east, see Sargeson (2013).  
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moving outside their home township did so alone. Only 21 percent were accompanied by 
family members (NBS 2015b).  
Scholars have noted that the practice of keeping one foot on the family farm, while 
also engaging in migrant waged labour, has advantages for the reproduction of both rural 
families and capital. For rural families, continued maintenance of a small landholding 
provides food security, care for dependants, and a fallback position for those who can no 
longer earn an income in the city due, for example, to economic downturn or their own injury, 
illness or old age. Meanwhile, the small family farm subsidizes capitalist profits by 
guaranteeing the cheap reproduction of a ‘reserve army of labour’ for the industrial and 
service sectors of China’s developing urban economy (Wen 2012; Chuang 2015, 2-4). 
However, beyond brief mentions of this point, there has been strikingly little attention to 
social reproduction in the literature on rural political economies and agrarian change in China, 
or indeed elsewhere in Asia.2 This paper seeks to address this lacuna. 
For Marxist political economists, ‘social reproduction’ traditionally refers to the 
perpetuation of a capitalist mode of production, especially the reproduction of industrial 
workers’ labour power and of class inequalities between capitalists and the proletariat. In 
comparison, in early feminist debates about social reproduction between the 1960s and 1980s, 
the term referred to the maintenance of existing life and reproduction of the next generation, 
achieved primarily through women’s unpaid care work and associated ‘domestic’ tasks, the 
chief concern being with institutions that maintain patriarchy and gender inequalities, as well 
as capitalism and class inequalities (Bakker and Silvey 2008, 2). 
2 Two partial exceptions, Zhang and Locke (2010) and Chuang (2015), discuss the relationship between gender, 
migration and household strategies for reproduction. However, neither explicitly addresses agrarian change.  
3 
 
                                                          
In the last two decades, there has been renewed interest in ‘social reproduction’ 
among feminist theorists, who broaden earlier Marxist and feminist understandings of the 
term, characterizing it as ‘the fleshy, messy, and indeterminate stuff of everyday life’ (Katz 
2001, 711); the material social practices through which people reproduce themselves on a 
daily and generational basis and through which the social relations and material bases of 
capitalism are renewed (Katz 2001, 709). These scholars draw attention to the emergence of 
new, translocal social relations and modes of reproductive work as being crucial for 
understanding contemporary developments in global capitalism (Katz 2001; Bakker and 
Silvey 2008).  
Building on these recent feminist theorizations, I understand social reproduction as 
encompassing four, interrelated aspects of modern, everyday life: biological reproduction 
through childbirth and child rearing; the reproduction of humans, through socialization and 
education as well as the provision of food, shelter and other goods; the maintenance of human 
wellbeing through the provision of welfare, health care and other services, and through social 
and cultural activities; and the reproduction of social relations and social institutions (Bakker 
and Silvey 2008, 2-3; Kofman 2012, 144; Peterson 2010, 272-73).  
Within these broad parameters, my particular interest in this paper is in ‘family 
reproduction,’ including the reproduction and maintenance of family members, and the 
reproduction of the family as a social institution and set of relationships. At the heart of the 
analytical framework I propose is the relationship between rural labour migration, rural 
family reproduction, and agrarian change, defined as transformation in ‘the social relations 
and dynamics of production and reproduction, property and power in agrarian formations’ 
(Bernstein 2010, 1). Shifts in rural family reproduction accompanying labour outmigration 
are, I argue, core components of agrarian change, which also contribute to other aspects of 
agrarian change in various, significant ways.  
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I argue that there are two interconnected sets of issues relating to family reproduction 
of particular importance for a rigorous understanding of the dynamics of agrarian change, 
which largely have been ignored by political economists to date. The first relates to the 
unpaid ‘reproductive work’ that family members undertake in order to achieve family 
reproduction. This includes subsistence farming; the work of maintaining social connections 
with kin and others, through mutual aid, gift-giving, loans, visits, and rituals, such as funerals 
and weddings; and ‘care work.’ The last, on which this paper focuses, includes domestic 
tasks, such as buying and preparing food, cleaning house, doing laundry, and fetching 
firewood and water; child rearing and socialization; and the work of caring for young 
children, the sick and handicapped, and the frail elderly.  
  
In existing discussions of agrarian change in China, as elsewhere, there is a serious 
neglect of reproductive work, especially care work. As a corollary, this literature tends to be 
blind to the agency and experiences of those responsible for such work, and blind to families’ 
concerns to accomplish reproductive tasks. In contrast, in this paper I argue that reproductive 
work, especially care work, is a crucial component in the strategies that rural families employ 
to achieve family reproduction. And I demonstrate that changes in the ways in which 
reproductive work is accomplished and by whom, and changes in divisions between 
‘productive’ and ‘reproductive’ work, are core elements of agrarian change. 
The second set of issues relates to aspirations for family reproduction as being drivers 
of agrarian change. Across rural China since the 1980s, rural ambitions to get off the farm, or 
more particularly, to get one’s children out of farming into stable, urban employment, have 
spurred desires for children to receive a longer period of education in better-quality schools. 
Meanwhile, villagers have sought to ‘keep up with the Joneses’ also by building or buying 
increasingly expensive housing.  
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To date, such issues have rarely received detailed investigation in the literature on 
agrarian change in China or elsewhere in Asia. In this paper, I seek to redress this neglect. 
New aspirations, I argue, are driving changes in rural strategies for family reproduction, 
contributing to various changes in agrarian political economy and society. These include new 
patterns of work; new forms of intra-family as well as class differentiation,3 and a high 
degree of change, fluidity and flux in expectations and practices relating to gender and 
generational roles within the family.   
The remainder of the paper is divided into three parts. In the first, the aim is to 
highlight the empirical significance of these two sets of issues pertaining to rural family 
reproduction through a case study of one village. Gingko village (a pseudonym) is located in 
the central Chinese province of Henan. In the contemporary Chinese context, it is unusual in 
that significant numbers of its residents have migrated overseas as well as within China. 
Nevertheless, key trends apparent in Gingko village, in the relationship between migration, 
shifts in family reproductive work, changing aspirations and strategies for family 
reproduction, and other aspects of agrarian change are common to rural communities across 
China and other parts of developing Asia.  
In the second and third parts of the paper, I develop an analytical framework for 
understanding these trends. I begin with a brief critical review of the ‘livelihoods perspective’ 
on agrarian change, and two other approaches to social and political-economic change, 
focusing on ‘global householding’ and the cultural reproduction of class and gender. I then 
build on this review to propose a new analytical framework for understanding the nexus 
3 I understand the term ‘social differentiation’ to refer to the creation of differences in peoples’ positioning in 
relations of production and reproduction, and consequent inequalities in control and access to resources, and 
wellbeing and social status.  In this perspective, ‘differentiation’ refers to patterns of gender and 
intergenerational inequalities, as well as to class stratification. 
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between shifts in translocal family reproduction and other aspects of agrarian change in rural 
China and, by extension, elsewhere in developing Asia. 
Gingko village4  
Gingko village, with a population of about 1,750 people, is located in New County (Xin 
Xian),5 in the historically poor, mountainous border region of southern Henan. In the 1930s 
and 40s, New County belonged to a key base area for the Communist Party, and consequently,  
has since been accorded unusual privileges, including the right, granted its Labour Bureau in 
the 1980s, to recruit labourers for short-term overseas employment. For more than three 
decades, Gingko families have combined agricultural production, especially rice-farming on 
small plots of land,6 with both domestic and overseas migrant employment.7  
Migration  
In the 1980s, a small number of men began to trickle out of Gingko village in search of 
waged work, primarily in the construction industry. Then, from the 1990s, with migrant 
incomes increasingly higher than farming incomes, the number of people migrating out grew 
rapidly, so that by the 2000s, most of the labour force was engaged in non-agricultural 
employment and lived outside New County most of the time. In 2015, about 700 people, or 
40 percent of Gingko’s total population, were working long-term as migrant labourers – 500 
4 This account is based on 2.5 months’ ethnographic fieldwork in the village in 2015- 2016. Figures provided 
are for 2015.   
5 In order to protect identities, pseudonyms are used for all individuals as well as the village. New County, 
however, is not a pseudonym. 
6 In 2015, Gingko villagers had access to about 1,326 mu of arable land, or an average of  0.8 mu per person. 
One mu is the equivalent of 0.16 acres. 
7 There are very few local, non-agricultural employment opportunities in the village or its vicinity. 
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in other counties and provinces in China and 200 overseas. Almost everyone aged 18-40 
years had spent many years working away from home, including at least one year overseas. 
Through the 1980s and early 1990s, many more men migrated out of Gingko village 
than women, but with increases in employment opportunities for migrant women, this 
changed. Already by the late 1990s, most adults of both sexes under the age of 50 were 
spending most of the year in non-agricultural waged employment away from home. The 
majority, however, left their small children and ageing parents behind. With rural, non-local 
household registration (hukou), their citizenship rights in urban areas, including the right to 
social welfare and education for their children, were curtailed, and living costs were 
prohibitively high. This was particularly the case in the largest metropolises and between the 
1980s and early 2000s. Since then, hukou restrictions have eased, making it much easier and 
cheaper for rural migrant families to live in small towns and cities. However, in the larger 
metropolises, where employment opportunities are more plentiful and lucrative, it remains 
prohibitively expensive for migrants to settle (Jacka, Kipnis and Sargeson 2013, 65-81). 
 
With the advent of large-scale labour outmigration, understandings about ‘productive’ 
and ‘reproductive’ work shifted, and among those remaining in the village, new patterns of 
work and divisions of labour emerged. In the 1980s, there was a ‘feminization’ of agriculture, 
with women becoming an increasingly large proportion of the agricultural labour force (cf. 
Jacka 1997, 128-40). Then, from the 1990s, with more and more young and middle-aged 
women as well as men leaving the village, there was an ‘ageing’ of agriculture, with 
responsibility for farm work being devolved onto men and women of increasingly advanced 





For the last twenty to thirty years, most small children have been raised almost entirely by 
their grandparents, especially grandmothers, who have taken over childcare responsibilities 
so young women can undertake migrant waged work. As a consequence, many of today’s 
elderly women have devoted a very large part of their lives to raising children. Sixty-two-
year-old Mrs Li, for example, has raised ten children; three sons of her own, and all of her 
sons’ seven children.8 She raised each grandchild from the age of just a couple of months 
until they were 5-10 years old. Of course, many grandmothers have both multiple 
grandchildren, and frail parents and parents-in-law in need of care. These women are the 
backbone of the family economy, shouldering the greatest responsibility for care work as well 
as engaging in agriculture. 
Over the years, the declining profitability of agriculture relative to non-agricultural 
employment, the consequent loss of labour power to migrant waged work, and the burden of 
care work shouldered by the depleted population left behind have led to major changes in 
agriculture, including shifts in the type of crops grown, a sharp reduction in the number of 
livestock raised, and a shrinkage in the amount of land farmed by most families. For the 
majority, agriculture has shifted from being mostly ‘productive’ to primarily ‘reproductive’ 
work. The changes have been particularly noticeable since the mid-2000s. Finding it too 
difficult to grow rice for the market, and faced with a growing scarcity of hired labour, an 
increasingly large proportion of the left-behind have stopped irrigating their paddy land.  
Some of the non-irrigated land they plant with less labour-intensive crops of peanuts and 
canola, primarily for family consumption, and the rest they leave uncultivated. 
8 Gingko villagers in Mrs Li’s generation mostly have between three and seven children. Younger villagers, who 
began their families after the introduction of the one-child policy at the end of the 1970s, mostly have two 
children. Single-child families are rare. 
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However, this retreat from market-oriented farming among the majority has eased the 
way for an alternative response to the declining profitability of agriculture among a minority. 
Thus, a few villagers have expanded their farming, cultivating paddy land no longer farmed 
by those to whom it was contracted, as well as their own, in most cases without remuneration. 
Most have farmed no more than an additional couple of mu, but one household has added 100 
mu to the land they cultivate. In addition, in 2013-2014, an external entrepreneur leased 200 
mu, or 19 percent of the village’s paddy land, consolidating it into large fields. He signed 20-
year leases with village households, paying them an annual pittance of 300 yuan9 per mu. 
Some elderly farmers refused to lease out their land, but most, unable to farm it themselves, 
did so willingly (cf. Trappel 2016, 81-99).10   
Changing aspirations  
The older generation’s reproductive work has enabled youth engagement in migrant 
employment, which in turn has increased family incomes. As a result, while it continues to be 
officially labelled a ‘poor village,’ many villagers are anything but poor.11 Improvements in 
incomes have been further bolstered by redistributive policies introduced nationally from the 
mid-2000s. These include the removal of agricultural taxes and of tuition fees for nine years’ 
compulsory education; the introduction of a new cooperative medical insurance scheme and a 
9 In 2013-2015, 1 yuan was equivalent to about US $0.16. 
10 Across China, ‘land transfers’ (liuzhuan), such as these, have been spurred by recent state initiatives, 
especially the provision of subsidies, aimed at promoting large-scale, mechanized agricultural production, and 
shoring up national food security in the wake of rural labour outmigration (Ye 2015; Trappel 2016, 119-69).  
11 In 2015, village officials reported the average income per person in Gingko village to be 4,400 yuan, or about 
42 percent of the national rural average, but admitted that figure was probably out of date. At that time, 
domestic migrant labourers earned an average annual per capita net income of 20-30,000 yuan, while overseas 
labourers earned about 80-100,000 yuan. 
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minimum livelihood guarantee system of welfare payments; and the rolling-out of a basic 
pension scheme for all rural residents over the age of 60 (Leung and Xu 2015, 98-124).  
The resultant increases in villager incomes have fuelled new social expectations and 
aspirations for family reproduction, and consequently, shifts in patterns of consumption, 
investment, divisions of labour and patterns of work. Most families have invested little in 
agriculture. Instead, some have set up family businesses, and the majority have poured their 
savings into building or buying a new apartment or house. This is because a family’s housing 
indicates their wealth and social status, and consequently, a substantial new house or 
apartment is a must for any young man seeking to marry (cf. Murphy 2009, 57-58). 
Investment in housing, in other words, is a key strategy for the reproduction of the patrilineal 
family. Over the last several years, the new housing has been getting more lavish, and often 
has been bought in New County city, about 40 minutes’ drive from the village.12 However, 
most of the new buildings’ interiors are unfinished, and at least a third are empty, with 
migrant labourers continuing to live and work elsewhere for several years before being able 
to afford interior work and furnishings.  
In addition, families’ concerns about reproduction of the next generation have led 
them to invest more in children’s education, with consequences also for women’s work. Until 
recently, most children stayed with their grandparents and undertook their first few years of 
education in the Gingko village primary school (which included pre-school and grades 1-3), 
and the neighbouring village primary school (pre-school to grade 5).  Those who continued 
went to boarding school in the local township or in New County city. In the mid-2010s, 
however, a new trend emerged, with mothers, who left their babies with grandparents to 
12 In 2015, the village head estimated that in the preceding few years, 10-20 Gingko households had bought 
apartments in New County city each year. 
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become long-distance migrant waged labourers, returning when it came time for the children 
to go to school. They rented or bought an apartment in New County city, and during the week, 
they and their children lived there, so the children could attend a better-quality urban school. 
Scholars have termed these women peidu mama, literally ‘mums who accompany [their 
children] to school’ (Ye, Pan and He 2014, 40).13 
The peidu mama phenomenon, which is increasingly widespread across China, is 
partially a response to state educational policy and to anxieties about educational, health, 
safety and emotional problems among left-behind children. In recent years, the state has 
sought to rationalize educational funding by removing resources from small village primary 
schools and centralizing them in larger village and township schools, many of which have 
boarding facilities. The primary school in the village neighbouring Gingko is one such 
centralized school. Policy makers view centralized boarding schools as an answer to concerns 
about ageing grandparents’ difficulties keeping lively young children from drowning in local 
fish ponds, for example, and their inability to discipline them and help them complete 
homework (Murphy 2014, 35).  However, Gingko parents complain that the quality of 
education in the neighbouring village and the township schools, while better than in Gingko 
village, cannot compare with that offered in city schools. They also worry about the high 
costs of boarding, and about the wellbeing of children, both in boarding school and while 
they are at home on weekends in the village.  
Between 2013 and 2015, the number of children attending the Gingko village school 
declined from 100 to ten. In 2015, there were 190 peidu mama from Gingko village living in 
New County city with their children. Many took their children back to the village once or 
twice a fortnight to check in with their parents-in-law and help with farming. However, some 
13 According to Shirlena Huang and Brenda Yeoh, the term peidu mama was first coined in the early 2000s by 
the Chinese media in Singapore to refer to urban middle-class mothers from China accompanying their 
children to Singapore for the children’s education (Huang and Yeoh 2011, 395). 
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grandparents, especially grandmothers, also spent part of their time in New County city, 
helping out with care work. This helped some young mothers find income-generating work, 
though very few found jobs that made them as much as they previously earned as migrant 
labourers.  
Changes in the family  
Changes in the divisions of labour and forms of cooperation that Gingko family members 
adopt in their efforts to meet reproductive needs have been accompanied by shifts in the 
relationship between the household and the family, and renegotiations of the roles and status 
of women, and the relationship between generations (cf. Fan 2015, 198-200). Previously, 
families with two or more sons divided (fenjia) after the sons married, with all but one son 
moving into a new house and establishing new households with their wives, separate from 
their parents, and contract land also being divided. With large-scale outmigration, though, 
family division has lost its meaning and often does not occur in a formal way. In part this is 
because the division and inheritance of land, once so central to rural Chinese culture and 
economy, is losing its significance for young people, as farming becomes less important to 
their livelihoods. All the same, sons who migrate out long-term, almost by definition, divide 
the family by moving house and establishing a separate budget, although most provide at 
least some financial support to their parents. Meanwhile, as noted above, the older generation 
plays a crucial role in raising their grandchildren, regardless of whether they belong to the 
same household or not.  
In tandem with these shifts, has been a change in intergenerational relations, 
especially between women. Previously, older women advised and helped their daughters-in-
law with childcare to a greater or lesser extent, but today, it is taken for granted that they care 
for small children by themselves. Much of this care work is provided without financial 
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support: not only are grandmothers not remunerated for their care work, they and their 
husbands commonly also bear most if not all their grandchildren’s everyday living costs, as 
well as their own. Relieving their adult children of the financial and labour costs of care work 
does not appear to garner the elderly respect or appreciation within the family. Instead, a 
failure to provide childcare is quite often used by sons and daughters-in-law to justify a 
refusal to provide financial support for the older generation as they age. At the same time, 
some parents criticise grandparents, for example, for being ‘dirty’ or for not disciplining 
children. For their part, grandparents often express shame at the ‘inadequacy’ of their 
contribution to the younger generation, and try to minimise the ‘burden’ they impose on them, 
for example, by not seeking medical treatment, for which they would need their adult 
children to pay (cf. Santos, 2016).  
One reason for the shift in the mother- daughter-in-law relationship is the fact that 
women becoming adults in the last few decades are more educated and worldly, and earn 
higher incomes than the older generation. But women still earn less than men. This gender 
differential has been a key consideration underpinning the feminization of agriculture, 
women’s rather than men’s dominance in care work, and most recently, the peidu mama 
phenomenon. In turn, women’s relative lack of income increases their dependence on 
husbands, sons and others, and reduces their autonomy and bargaining power relative to men 
in the family.  
In addition to these broad historical shifts, over their life-course, villagers are now 
moving physically and experiencing shifts in their work-roles and responsibilities far more 
often than in previous decades. This flux is enabled and accompanied by change in the 
institution of the family, and a high degree of variation between dominant family values and 
actual behaviour and relationships. Again, this is particularly obvious in regards to care work 
and the relationship between women in the family. In line with the dominant institution of the 
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patrilineal family, the ideal is for older people, especially women, to care for their sons’ 
grandchildren, but not their daughters.’ And in turn, as they become too old to manage on 
their own, the elderly are expected to live with and be taken care of by sons and their wives, 
not daughters. In reality though, many older women are continually on the move, providing 
care and being cared for by a range of different family members, in ways not always in 
accordance with patrilineal ideals. 
Take, for example, 78 year-old widow Mrs Hu, who has two sons and four daughters, 
all married with children. In the year 2000, she went to live with her youngest son and his 
family in the faraway city of Urumqi. After a year, she returned, and since then has rotated 
every few weeks between her home in the village and the homes of her four daughters, two of 
whom live in a neighbouring village and two in the county city. She spends the longest 
periods of time living with and helping her third daughter, who suffers from chronic liver 
disease. Her oldest son lives and works in Beijing, but his wife and young son live in Gingko 
village, in a new house down the hill from Mrs Hu. Mrs Hu does not get on with this 
daughter-in-law, and neither receives support from her nor provides care for her grandson. 
The daughter-in-law is much closer to her own mother, who lives in another part of the 
village, visiting her several times a week. She gives her mother more financial support and 
help with farm work than either of her two brothers, or her sister. 
Social differentiation 
Young people’s outmigration, and consequent improvements in their incomes and changes in 
their aspirations, have also fed into processes of social differentiation, exacerbating 
inequalities both between Gingko families and within them. To illustrate, I compare 86 year-
old Mrs Chen and her two sons, with their neighbour, 85-year-old widower, Mr Zhou. Mrs 
Chen bore five sons and three daughters. Her husband died thirty years ago, and both her 
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oldest and youngest sons have also died. The two sons living with her have been mentally 
handicapped since birth. Both are unmarried. A lack of labour power and of financial and 
social capital has meant that Mrs Chen and her unmarried sons have been unable to climb out 
of poverty. They live in squalid conditions in an old house in the village, surviving on modest 
state welfare payments and subsistence agriculture. However, Mrs Chen’s other son and her 
daughters are better off. Access to domestic, non-agricultural migrant employment 
opportunities has improved their incomes and enabled them to rent or buy higher-quality 
urban housing. None of these family members provide any financial assistance to Mrs Chen’s 
household.  
Mrs Chen’s neighbour, Mr Zhou, has four sons, who are among the wealthiest of 
Gingko villagers. Mr Zhou previously served as a low-level village official; a position likely 
to have helped him accrue the social and financial capital necessary for his sons to obtain 
migrant employment overseas. This employment then further enriched the sons, enabling all 
of them to buy apartments in New County city. However, only one son and his family 
actually live in New County – the others live in Beijing and overseas. Mr Zhou considers 
himself fortunate because his sons have prospered, and they give him more money than most. 
But his living conditions are only slightly better than Mrs Chen’s, and according to Mrs 
Chen’s son, Mr Zhou’s circumstances are more ‘pitiful’ (kelian) because he is alone most of 
the time. Apart from Chinese New Year, the only time he sees any family is when the oldest 
son and his wife visit briefly once a fortnight.14  
Elderly Mr Zhou’s aloneness, and the gap between his and Mrs Chen’s living 
conditions on the one hand, and those of their absent children on the other, are  common in 
14 There are a number of very old residents of Gingko village like Mr Zhou, whom other villagers describe as 
‘pitiful’ because they live alone and their adult children rarely visit. They rarely describe themselves as such. In 
some cases, this appears to be because they feel ashamed of their children’s lack of filiality. In others, it seems 
to relate to ‘descending familism,’ whereby the elderly themselves accept a family prioritisation of younger 
generations’ needs and wellbeing over their own. Descending familism is further discussed below.  
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Gingko and point to a new form of differentiation between generations. Up-and-coming 
young and middle-aged villagers are investing in themselves and the next generation far more 
than they are giving back to the previous generation. 
Summary 
This case study illustrates trends in translocal family reproduction that are central to the 
dynamics of agrarian change in villages across China. First, reproductive work, especially the 
work of older family members in subsistence agriculture and in meeting care needs, is crucial 
to the rural economy, for it enables large-scale labour outmigration among the young and 
middle-aged. In addition, reproductive needs and aspirations, particularly the need to care for 
dependants, especially children, and to provide for the family’s future, are a major driver of 
rural families’ economic behaviour.  
This is commonly not fully appreciated by scholars of agrarian change. Jan Douwe 
van der Ploeg and colleagues, for example, describe the ‘split family’ approach to migration 
as shaped by efforts to balance the short-term financial gains of migrant waged employment 
against a longer-term cultural commitment to the land and farming and a desire for the 
security they provide. ‘The, oft-articulated, thesis that migrant work represents a definitive 
adieu to [small family] farming,’ they suggest, ‘is a fallacy,’ for rural families continue to 
invest in the land, and young migrant labourers remain attached, and consequently return, to 
farming in middle and old age  (Van der Ploeg et al. 2014,172). Gingko village suggests a 
different story. Rather than attempting to balance the financial gains of migrant labour against 
a need to maintain farming, Gingko families are balancing migrant wage incomes against the 
fulfilment of care needs. In the resultant strategies, very small-scale subsistence farming is 
important as a source of food security for left-behind carers, most of whom have low cash 
incomes. However, little investment is made in paddy land and rice farming for the market is 
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deprioritized, because it is unsustainably labour-intensive and much less profitable than 
migrant work, and it is not the future young migrant workers imagine for themselves and 
their children. Most Gingko villagers are, in fact, saying goodbye to farming as a livelihood 
and way of life. In turn, as René Trappel suggests is happening across China, this withdrawal 
of the majority of villagers out of market-oriented farming is lending impetus to, and easing 
the way for, a further agrarian development – the commodification of farmland, and the 
scaling-up and mechanization of commercial agricultural production (Trappel 2016, 81-99; 
119-69). 
Second, shifts in rural aspirations and needs for family reproduction, and in the 
strategies families employ to meet those needs, are linked with various important social 
changes. Scholars most commonly associate aspirations for high-class housing and improved 
education for one’s children, such as are observed in Gingko village, with a rising ‘middle-
class’ in China and other Asian cities. Nevertheless, studies undertaken elsewhere in rural 
China by Rachel Murphy (2014), Wei Chunlin (2015) and others suggest that Gingko village 
is by no means unusual; such aspirations are as widespread in well-off (and even not so well-
off) villages as in middle-class urban communities.  
These aspirations both result from and contribute to important shifts in family 
relations, and differentiation within families and between them. Of particular significance is 
the emergence of what anthropologist, Yan Yunxiang, aptly calls ‘descending familism,’ 
whereby  
the trinity of the three generations adapts to a new and flexible form of family 
structure, family resources of all sorts flow downward, and, most important, the focus 
of the existential meanings of life has shifted from the ancestors to the grandchildren 
(Yan 2016, 245).  
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Yan describes this trend in largely positive terms, highlighting the new forms of 
intergenerational intimacy with which it is associated. In contrast, while not denying 
intergenerational intimacy, I would highlight new forms of intergenerational and gender 
differentiation associated with descending familism in Gingko village. As shown above, in 
their drive to meet social expectations for family reproduction, villagers have been adopting 
measures to improve children’s life chances and social status, some of which feed into 
overwork, poverty and lack of care for elderly grandparents, and others, which contribute to 
declines in the autonomy and bargaining power of young mothers (cf. Murphy 2014, 62-64; 
Chuang 2015).  
Elsewhere in Asia, roles within the family have undergone different transformations. 
For example, in the Philippines and Vietnam, where there are more migrant women than men, 
men have taken on a greater role in reproductive work, and new identities – of ‘caring men’ 
and ‘empowered women’ – have been created (Nguyen and Locke 2014, 865-66. See also, 
Nguyen 2014, 1396-99). In all cases, though, changing strategies for family reproduction 
have been associated with shifts in intra-family gender and intergenerational divisions of 
labour, and the emergence of new identities and forms of intra-family differentiation.  
These trends have been neglected by mainstream scholars of agrarian change, who 
understand ‘social differentiation’ solely in terms of class. And yet, aside from being 
important aspects of agrarian change in their own right, such changes also contribute to class 
differentiation. Thus, the social mobility of wealthy Gingko households, and the physical and 
social distance they create between themselves and the peasant class remaining in the village, 
are imbricated with and enabled by a re-configuration of intra-family divisions of labour, and  
new gender and intergenerational power relations and patterns of inequality.  
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Third, the above account illustrates how recent changes in rural family reproduction 
are associated with tremendous fluidity and flux in intra-family relations. This observation 
resonates with findings from other research into migration and social transformation, 
conducted elsewhere in China and other parts of Asia, and, indeed, all over the world (e.g 
Mummert 2010; Kipnis 2016; Nguyen 2014; Deneva 2012;Baldassar and Merla 2014). These 
studies all find that highly dynamic intra-family gender and intergenerational relations are a 
corollary of the shifts that occur in families’ strategies for accomplishing reproductive work 
in the wake of capitalist development, especially increases in labour mobility. 
Finally, the Gingko case study shows that transformations in rural family reproduction 
are intimately connected with changes in a range of policies, structures, and social institutions 
at local, national and global levels. In existing studies of migration in Asia, the translocal split 
family strategy commonly is viewed as shaped by policies and structures, such as China’s 
household registration system, which compound socio-economic inequalities between places 
of migrant origin and destination, and make migrant family settlement away from the place of 
origin untenable (Fan 2015, 194-95). The above case study shows, though, that in rural China, 
in addition to the household registration system, various other state policies have an 
important impact on translocal family reproduction. For example, the peidu mama 
phenomenon and village children’s education in urban schools are, on the one hand, partially 
enabled by the removal of tuition fees for compulsory education, as well as other 
improvements in rural income resulting from the removal of agricultural taxes and the 
introduction of welfare schemes. In addition, the state’s implementation of family planning 
policies from the late 1970s reduced the number of children born, thus increasing the 
resources available for investment in each child’s education. On the other hand, the 
enrolment of village children in urban schools is also partially a response to problems caused 
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by the state’s closure of small village schools and concentration of educational resources in 
larger population centres. 
Furthermore, global social and political-economic trends must be taken into account, 
because, for one thing, opportunities and demand for rural migrant labour (overseas and 
within China) are highly dependent on the vicissitudes of the global economy. For another, 
increased exposure to transnational consumer cultures via migration, television and, most 
recently, the internet has an important role in shaping aspirations for family reproduction in 
villages such as Gingko.   
To date, scholarship on agrarian change in Asia has been dominated by two analytical 
approaches: a Marxist structuralist approach, and a ‘livelihoods perspective,’ focusing on 
rural households’ livelihood strategies. Concentrating on the micro-level, the latter approach 
has more potential for understanding shifts in family reproduction of the kind found in 
Gingko village, but is nevertheless seriously limited. The next part of the paper outlines its 
main limitations before reviewing two other approaches to social and political-economic 
change, relating to ‘global householding’ and the cultural reproduction of class and gender. 
Neither of these approaches has previously been adopted in the mainstream literature on 
agrarian change in Asia.  Each has advantages over the livelihoods perspective, but 
nevertheless requires modification for understanding the nexus between shifts in translocal 
family reproduction and other aspects of agrarian change. 
Livelihoods, global householding, and the cultural reproduction of class and gender  
For our purposes, the most obvious limitation of studies taking the livelihoods perspective is 
that they understand ‘livelihood strategies’ very narrowly, in terms of households’ efforts to 
generate an income. Household members’ concerns about and efforts to meet reproductive 
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needs, especially the need to care for dependants, are usually neglected in analyses of 
livelihood strategies (Zhang and Locke 2010, 54-55).  
Less obviously, perhaps, these studies tend to be limited by the assumption that rural 
households’ aims for family reproduction are essentially universal and static, relating only to 
the fulfilment of basic needs. They generally fail to appreciate that with economic and social 
development, come various new, increased aspirations for family reproduction, which drive 
further changes in families’ economic behaviour. 
A final set of limitations of the livelihoods perspective relates to its focus on the 
household. First of all, in the context of rural China, it makes more sense to focus on ‘the 
family’ rather than the ‘household.’  Historically, the Chinese term ‘household’ (hu) refers to 
a group of kin, usually a nuclear or stem family, who live together and share a budget, and for 
administrative purposes, are registered as belonging to the same place of residence. The term 
‘the family’ (jia) refers to a group of close kin, whose members may or may not belong to the 
same household. For centuries, the majority of rural Chinese families have been patrilocal 
and patrilineal, and practices aimed at reproducing the patriline have been at the heart of rural 
Chinese society and culture. As illustrated in the Gingko village case study, today, most 
villagers’ household strategies continue to be at least partially motivated by concern for the 
reproduction of the broader, patrilineal family as well as the household, and are characterized 
by forms of cooperation and divisions of labour that span multiple households. As discussed, 
however, there also have been significant changes in the meanings associated with both ‘the 
household’ and ‘the family’, in the relationships between members of the two, and in the 
practices through which they are formed and reproduced. These shifts are an important, 




A further problem with the focus on the household is that it is simultaneously too 
‘micro’ and not micro enough. On the one hand, studies with a livelihoods perspective often 
neglect the connections between livelihoods and macro-level (i.e., global, national and local) 
state policies and structures, and social institutions (Scoones 2009, 180). On the other hand, 
beyond noting gender constraints on women’s productive activities, they commonly pay 
insufficient attention to the intra-family gender and intergenerational politics shaping family 
members’ involvement in and determination of livelihood strategies (Zhang and Locke 2010, 
54). 
We turn next to studies of ‘global householding’ as an answer to at least some of the 
limitations of the livelihoods perspective. 
Global householding  
Studies of migration, global households and global householding, many of them undertaken 
in Asia, especially Southeast Asia, have played a key part in the recent renaissance in 
feminist interest in social reproduction under global capitalism (Kofman 2012). 
To take one example, Maliha Safri and Julie Graham define the global household as 
comprising geographically dispersed kin and non-kin, who are linked and may be described 
as a single entity because of ties of economic and emotional interdependence and structures 
of decision-making or governance (Safri and Graham 2010, 107). They argue for a focus on 
‘household production,’ especially non-market oriented production of domestic and caring 
services by household members, as a cornerstone in a feminist, postcapitalist international 
political economy, which understands contemporary economies around the world as being 
constituted by the interrelations between a heterogenous and shifting array of capitalist and 
noncapitalist transactions and modes of production (Safri and Graham 2010, 103).  
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Somewhat similarly, for Mike Douglass, the household – which ‘may consist of 
fictive as well as actual kin, of distant as well as under-the-roof members, and of hired 
domestic helpers and nannies who become household members’ – is ‘the foundation of the 
world economy’ (Douglass 2006, 421). He uses the term ‘householding’ to highlight the fact 
that creating and sustaining a household is an ongoing, dynamic process of social 
reproduction.  The typical elements of householding, Douglass suggests, include marriage or 
other partnering; bearing, raising and educating children; maintaining the household on a 
daily basis; dividing labour and pooling income from livelihood activities; and caring for 
elderly and other non-working household members. With his focus on global householding, 
he emphasizes that, with globalization, these activities are increasingly reliant on the 
movement of people, and transactions among household members originating from or 
residing in more than one nation (Douglass 2006, 423).  
For the purposes of analysing the relationship between migration (whether 
transnational or translocal), shifts in family reproduction and other aspects of agrarian change, 
the global householding approach has obvious advantages over the livelihoods perspective. In 
particular, as the outline above of Safri and Graham’s, and Douglass’s approaches makes 
clear, recognition of the significance to political economies of reproductive work, especially 
care work, and of families’ concerns with social reproduction, lie at the heart of 
conceptualizations of global households and householding. As a result, furthermore, studies 
of global householding tend to display a greater awareness of the need to link different scales 
of analysis than do most studies written from a livelihoods perspective. They are 
simultaneously more sensitive to gender and intergenerational politics within households, and 
more attentive to the ways in which these are shaped by and contribute to shifts in the global 
political economy.  
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Recently, some scholars have adapted the global householding approach for studies of 
translocal, as opposed to transnational, migration in rural China and Vietnam (Jacka 2012; 
Liu 2014; Nguyen 2014). However, while generating insights into the nature of shifts in 
householding strategies and their implications for the wellbeing of family members left-
behind in the village, these studies have not yet realised the potential of the global 
householding approach for bridging the gap between micro and macro scales of analysis. We 
need to pay more attention to the links between shifting householding strategies, intra-family 
politics, and institutions, structures and processes in the local and national political economy. 
Furthermore, while it might once have been possible to consider China’s rural political 
economy as different from capitalist states’ and divorced from global capitalism, that is no 
longer feasible: As indicated above, rural aspirations and strategies for family reproduction 
are heavily influenced by developments in global capitalism. 
There are some limitations to the global householding approach, similar to those of 
the livelihoods perspective. Thus, while Safri and Graham’s and Douglass’s 
conceptualizations of global households and householding are valuable for their appreciation 
of translocality, they do not accord with Chinese understandings of the term ‘household,’ but 
come closer to Chinese conceptualizations of the ‘family’ and shifting connections between 
households and families. In addition, the global householding approach is similar to the 
livelihoods perspective in neglecting the significance of aspirations for family reproduction in 
driving economic and social change.  
The cultural reproduction of class and gender 
For inspiration on how to analyse this issue, we turn now to a recent body of scholarship 
tracing links between consumer capitalism, changing aspirations for family reproduction, new 
gender and class identities, and the rise of a ‘middle class’ and middle-class culture in 
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modernizing Asia (e.g., Waters 2005; Zhang 2010; Nguyen 2015; Nguyen-Marshall et al. 
2012). Much of this work draws on concepts utilized by the social theorist, Pierre Bourdieu, 
in his work, Distinction… (1984), a study of the symbolic aspects of class and the 
reproduction over time of class-based power and privilege in France.  
For example, in their book about the urban middle class in Vietnam, Van Nguyen-
Marshall and colleagues draw on Bourdieusian concepts to portray a class – specifically the 
Vietnamese middle class – as a social group marked out by their possession of certain types 
of symbolic capital and a particular type of ‘habitus;’ a ‘socially situated set of dispositions 
individuals display through their lifestyle’ (Nguyen-Marshall et al. 2012, 10). However, in 
contrast to Bourdieu’s emphasis on early socialization in the acquisition of ‘habitus,’ they, 
like other scholars of the middle class in Asia, emphasize individuals’ purposive adoption of 
lifestyles and forms of consumption as a way of asserting their class position and ‘distinction.’ 
Further to this, they highlight the fact that in Vietnam’s recent history, as in China’s, there 
have been several instances when the value of symbolic capital is radically redefined by 
market and state actors, and citizens must employ new strategies in order to attain and 
maintain social status and ‘distinction’ (Nguyen-Marshall 2012, 10-11). 
Scholars of the middle class in Asia also commonly draw on the work of feminist 
scholars, who argue for the intimate connections between the production and reproduction of 
gender identities and the formation of class cultures and patterns of distinction and 
differentiation. In analysing gender and power in ‘affluent’ East and Southeast Asia, for 
example, Krishna Sen and colleagues (1998) draw on work by the historians, Leonore 
Davidoff and Catherine Hall (1987), which highlights the centrality of ideologies and 
practices linking femininity and domesticity in the creation of the middle class in nineteenth 
century England.   
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The majority of studies examining the cultural reproduction of gender and class in 
Asia are focused on the rise of an urban middle class; very few examine rural societies.15 
Most, furthermore, seek to chart the contours of new gender and class identities that are 
emerging, especially among the young, and say little about differences between generations 
or the broader dynamics of change through which new identities emerge and to which they 
contribute. Nevertheless, studies such as this provide leads on how feminist and Bourdieusian 
social theory could make a contribution to understandings of the relationship between shifts 
in rural family reproduction and other aspects of agrarian change, specifically social 
differentiation in the rural population. Beyond illustrating the value of particular concepts, 
especially ‘habitus’ and ‘distinction,’ these studies are valuable for their focus on culture, and 
their attention to the ways in which class, gender and other power  relations and forms of 
differentiation are shaped by social actors’ socially constructed, ‘subjective’ desires and 
aspirations, as well as by ‘objective’ economic factors.  
A new analytical framework  
We can now sketch out a new framework for studying agrarian change in contexts, such as in 
contemporary rural China, characterized by high levels of mobility, which both adjusts for 
limitations in the approaches outlined above, and further develops their strengths. This 
framework centres around shifts in translocal family reproduction. Within the framework, 
four interlocking issues are identified as key to analysis of the relationship between shifts in 
15 See, however, works by Wei (2015) and Yin (2015), which draw on Bourdieu to examine class reproduction 
and distinction in rural Zhejiang, China’s wealthiest province. Also relevant to this paper are studies by Ye 
(2014) and Nguyen (2015), both of which draw on feminist as well as Bourdieusian theory. Ye (2014) analyses 
the reproduction of class and gender in Bangladeshi men’s labour migration to Singapore. Nguyen examines the 
significance of rural women’s work as domestic servants in urban Vietnam for the production and reproduction 
of class and gender identities in both poor, rural families and the urban middle class. 
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translocal family reproduction and other aspects of agrarian change: changes in the 
organisation of reproductive work, especially rural family members’ unpaid care work; an 
increase in the translocality of rural strategies for family reproduction,  involving linkages 
between productive and reproductive work performed by family members in a variety of 
geographically dispersed locations; shifts in rural family relations, and expectations and 
behaviour relating to gender and inter-generational difference; and changes in rural family 
aspirations for reproduction and social mobility.  
With this framework, I take an actor-oriented approach to agrarian change, with the 
understanding that  
although it may be true that important structural changes result from the impact of 
outside forces (due to encroachment by the market, state or international bodies), it is 
theoretically unsatisfactory to base one’s analysis on the concept of external 
determinations. All forms of external intervention necessarily enter the existing 
lifeworlds of the individuals and social groups affected, and in this way they are 
mediated and transformed by these same actors and structures (Long 2001, 13). 
The proposed framework builds on understandings of social reproduction derived 
from recent feminist scholarship on global householding and social reproduction under 
capitalism, and feminist and Bourdieusian theory relating to the cultural reproduction of 
gender and class. In so doing, it brings several important innovations to the study of rural 
political economy and agrarian change in China. First, it foregrounds issues relating to 
change in reproductive work, especially care work. To date, most studies of rural political 
economy in China, as elsewhere, have focused on ‘production’ and productive labour, and 
have neglected reproductive work. And yet, as illustrated in the Gingko village case study, 
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reproductive work and the importance that rural families attach to it, have underpinned major 
changes in the agrarian Chinese economy.  
Second, it broadens the focus on class differentiation in Marxist analyses of agrarian 
change, to include also the production and reproduction of gender and intergenerational 
power relations and inequalities within rural families, and to examine the critical intersections 
between class and intra-family differentiation.  
Third, the proposed framework highlights the need for a multi-scalar analysis. Such 
analysis has been missing in most studies of agrarian change in China, which tend either to 
focus on broad structural changes in the political economy, or take the ‘household’ as the unit 
of analysis. In contrast, while beginning with the family, the proposed approach both delves 
into changing power relations, divisions of labour and patterns of cooperation within families 
and households, and connects those with shifts in institutions, structures and policies at local, 
national and global levels.  
A fourth, important innovation in the proposed framework is its attention to the socio-
cultural dimensions of agrarian change. There are two main aspects to this, relating to the 
social factors shaping rural strategies for reproduction, and to the significance of changing 
aspirations for family reproduction as drivers of agrarian change. Studies of agrarian change 
most commonly view households and individuals as ‘rational’ actors, concerned above all 
with livelihoods. In contrast, like the householding approach, the proposed framework 
recognizes that family members’ economic decisions and the patterns of work and divisions 
of labour they adopt are motivated by concerns relating to care, wellbeing, and the 
reproduction of the family; concerns that go well beyond the need to earn money. It also 
foregrounds the fact that economic behaviour is shaped by intra-family power relations, and 
social institutions guiding understandings of what is socially appropriate for those of different 
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genders and ages. However, as illustrated in the Gingko case study, neither social institutions 
nor the relationship between social institutions and actual behaviour are static. The proposed 
framework incorporates appreciation of fluidity and flux in rural family relations as being a 
central constituent element of agrarian change in the contemporary world.    
Finally, central to the new framework is the recognition that, with political-economic 
change come shifts in aspirations for family reproduction, social mobility and ‘distinction.’ In 
rural China, as in a range of other contexts, these shifts have been fuelled by 
commodification, increased interaction with global consumer culture, and changes in the 
opportunities and demands facing families as a result of the rise of a highly competitive, 
capitalist economy. In turn, as shown in the Gingko village case study, shifting aspirations 
have both drawn on and contributed to other important aspects of agrarian change, including 
new patterns of work and mobility, new family relations, and new forms of gender, 
intergenerational and class differentiation. 
Conclusion 
In developing this new analytical framework, I have sought to broaden our understanding of 
rural political economy and agrarian change, opening up the field of investigation to new 
issues and perspectives, relating to the significance of translocal reproductive work and 
changing aspirations for family reproduction in shaping rural families’ strategies for meeting 
the challenges and opportunities presented by global capitalism.  
This paper focuses on rural China, but at several points also notes similarities in key 
characteristics of family reproduction and the political economy between rural China and 
other postsocialist and capitalist contexts in Asia and elsewhere. Much can be learned about 
rural China, about other political economies, and about global capitalism by undertaking 
more systematic comparative studies. It is hoped that, building as it does on theoretical 
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approaches adopted by scholars in a range of contexts, the analytical framework developed in 
this paper provides a basis for such comparative studies.  
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